In a jury trial, the jury is ordinarily the exclusive judge of the value, weight and probative force of the evidence.28 Where the evidence is conflicting, the jury should reconcile it if it can, and, if it cannot, it should accept that part of it which the jury deems worthy of credit and reject that part of it deemed unworthy of credit, having due regard for the interest of the witnesses in the result of the suit, their opportunities for knowing that to which they have testified and all other circumstances which may aid the jury in reaching a conclusion as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight which should be given to their testimony.29
The jury is not obligated to accept evidence simply because it is uncontradicted. The jury is entitled to evaluate the evidence and accept that portion which it finds to be believable and to reject the balance.30
When a jury’s recollection of the evidence differs with anything said at trial by counsel, the jurors should let their memories control.31 Similarly, if the jury’s recollection of the evidence conflicts with anything said by the judge while instructing the jury, the jury’s recollection should control.32 In non-capital criminal cases, as the duty of the jury is limited to determining guilt or innocence, the jury should not allow its verdict to be influenced by the potential punishment.33 Similarly, it is impermissible for a jury in its deliberations to consider and evaluate the effect of a potential post-conviction remedies, such as a pardon, parole or probation. The knowledge of possible review by other government authorities may cause the jury to avoid its responsibility, and compromise on the question of guilt. Further, the jury may be tempted to compensate for what it considers future leniency or release and deal with the case more severely than it would otherwise.34
A “compromise” verdict, wherein some jurors surrender their conscientious convictions in return for some like surrender by other jurors, is invalid.35 However, an insufficient damages verdict, standing alone, does not necessarily indicate a compromise. Rather, the compromise must be evident from other factors of record which demonstrate that the deficient monetary award resulted from an impermissible compromise. To determine whether a verdict is a compromise verdict, a court looks for a close question of liability, a damages award that is grossly inadequate, and other circumstances such as length of jury deliberation. If sufficiently persuasive indicia of a compromise are present, then the issues of liability and damages are inseparable and a complete new trial is necessary.35.1
28. Washington v. State, ___ A.2d ___, ___ (Del. 2010); Ashley v. State, 988 A.2d 420, 422 (Del. 2010); Maddrey v. State, 975 A.2d 772, 775 (Del. 2009); Johnson v. State, 983 A.2d 904, 936 (Del. 2009); Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1069, 1095 (Del. 1987); Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Rose, 147 A.2d 500, 503 (Del. 1958); Gray v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 33 Del. 450, 139 A. 66, 77 (Del. 1926); Tobias v. People’s R. Co., 80 A. 358, 360 (Del. Super. 1911); Linthicum v. Truitt, 80 A. 245, 248 (Del. Super. 1911); State v. Primrose, 77 A. 717, 720 (Del. O. & T. 1910); State v. Moore, 74 A. 1112, 1113 (Del. Gen Sess. 1910); State v. Luff, 74 A. 1079, 1081 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1910); State v. Samuels, 67 A. 164, 166 (Del. O. & T. 1904).
29. State v. Matushefske, 215 A.2d 443, 449 (Del. Super. 1965); Baker v. Spruance, 91 A. 203, 204 (Del. Super. 1914); Brown v. Wilmington, 90 A. 44, 46-47 (Del. Super. 1914); State v. Naylor, 90 A. 880, 890 (Del. O. & T. 1913); Grier v. Samuel, 86 A. 209, 212 (Del. Super. 1913); Culbert v. Wilmington & P. Traction Co., 82 A. 1081, 1085 (Del. Super. 1912); Riccio v. People’s R. Co., 82 A. 604, 607 (Del. Super. 1912); State v. Stockley, 82 A. 1078, 1080 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1911); Gismondi v. People’s R. Co., 83 A. 136, 138 (Del. Super. 1911); Gatta v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 83 A. 788, 792 (Del. Super. 1911); Tobias v. People’s R. Co., 80 A. 358, 361 (Del. Super. 1911); State v. Coates, 79 A. 213, 215 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1911); Klair v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 78 A. 1085, 1098 (Del. Super. 1910); Campbell v. Walker, 78 A. 601, 604 (Del. Super. 1910); State v. Moore, 74 A. 1112, 1115 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1910); Joseph v. Johnson, 82 A. 30, 31 (Del. Super. 1908); State v. Shaffner, 69 A. 1004, 1005-06 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1908); Colbourn v. Wilmington, 56 A. 605, 607 (Del. Super. 1903).
30. Debernard v. Reed, 277 A.2d 684, 686 (Del. 1971); Lee v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., C.A. No. 79C-DE-l25, slip op. at 3, Taylor, J. (Del. Super. July 22, 1987) (ORDER).
31. State v. Matushefske, 215 A.2d 443, 446 (Del. Super. 1965).
32. Mauck v. Merchants’ & Mfrs’ Fire Ins. Co., 54 A. 952, 954 (Del. Super. 1903).
33. Hand v. State, 354 A.2d 140, 141 (Del. 1976).
34. Smith v. State, 317 A.2d 20 (Del. 1974); Kauffman v. State, 452 A.2d 945, 947 (Del. 1982).
35. Wilson v. State, 305 A.2d 312, 317 (Del. 1973). See also State v. Carey, 178 A. 877, 882 (Del. O. & T. 1935).
35.1. Foley v. Elkton Plaza Associates, LLC, C.A. No. 05C-05-176-PLA, slip op. at 13, Ableman, J. (Del. Super. Mar. 30, 2007).
© 2010 David L. Finger