As the burden of proof is on the party making the allegation,7 the burden of proof is generally on the plaintiff who is asserting a claim (and, by extension, on a defendant asserting a counterclaim or cross-claim) to establish all of the substantive elements of the claim.8 This rule has been recognized in cases involving negligence,9 breach of contract,10 conversion,11ejectment,12 fraud,13 malicious prosecution,14 trespass,15 and torts in general,15.1 promissory estoppel16 and trusts.17 The party having the burden of proof as to the substantive area of law involved also has the burden of proving any claimed special damages.18
In divorce cases, the burden of proof is on the petitioner to establish the right to a divorce.19 In an action contesting a will, the burden of proof is on the party claiming undue influence20 or lack of testamentary capacity.21 Similarly, the burden of proof falls on a party alleging lack of mental capacity in actions for the appointment of a guardian22 and actions challenging the validity of a deed23 or a contract.24
A defendant has the burden of proof as to any affirmative defenses,25 such as the absence of a real party in interest,26 recoupment27 or contributory negligence.28
A party, whether a plaintiff or defendant, claiming title or right by adverse possession or prescription has the burden of proving all necessary elements.29 Any party whose right to relief depends on establishing domicile has the burden of proving such domicile.30 The burden of proving estoppel is also on the party asserting it.31
The party claiming the existence of a partnership, whether the plaintiff or the defendant, has the burden of establishing such, existence.32 Similarly, the party asserting the existence of an agency relationship has the burden of proving it.33
In eminent domain cases, the action is brought by the government (with the exception of inverse condemnation cases, which are brought by the landowner), but the burden is on the defendant landowner to establish that the taking was improper,34 as well as the fair market value of the property.35
In an action brought under Delaware’s Freedom of Information Act, the burden is on the defendant government agency to justify keeping the requested records or hearings confidential.36
The necessary degree of proof in civil cases is generally described as a “preponderance of the evidence.”37 The term “preponderance of the evidence” does not refer to the number of witnesses or volume of documents offered by a party, but rather to the weight that the trier of fact ascribes to the evidence, taking into consideration the biases of the witnesses, their opportunity to observe and know of the event at issue, their recollection of the attendant circumstances and any and all other facts and circumstances that go to testing the accuracy of their testimony.38 A preponderance of the evidence exists when the weight which the trier of fact attributes to the evidence supporting a conclusion is greater than the weight the trier of fact attributes to the evidence that does not support that conclusion. If the evidence is evenly balanced, the party seeking to establish a preponderance of the evidence has failed to meet its burden.39 The requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence applies equally to proof of damages.40
7. Oberly v. Howard Hughes Medical Inst., 472 A.2d 366, 386 (Del. Ch. 1984); Murphy v. T. B. O’Toole, Inc., 47 Del. 99, 87 A.2d 637, 638 (Del. Super. 1952).
8. See Lee v. A.C. & S. Co., Inc., C.A. No. 79C-DE-125, slip op. at 7, Taylor, J. (Del. Super. June 22, 1987) (ORDER).
9. Delmarva Power & Light v. Stout, 380 A.2d 1365, 1367 (Del. 1977); Wilson v. Derrickson, 175 A.2d 400, 401 (Del. 1961); Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252, 267 (Del. 1961); State use of Henderson v. Clark, 20 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1941); McCartney v. Peoples R. Co., 78 A. 771, 772 (Del. 1911); Queen Anne’s R. Co. v. Reed, 59 A. 860, 861 (Del. 1905).
10. Terry v. Parsons, 102 A. 985, 987 (Del. Super. 1918); Donovan v. Maloney, 84 A. 1032, 1034 (Del. Super. 1912).
11. Gam v. Cordrey, 53 A. 334, 335 (Del. Super. 1902).
12. Doe v. Roe, 80 A. 352, 354 (Del. Super. 1911); Downs v. Carnvale, C.A. No. 84C-DE7, slip op. at 5, Chandler, J. (Del. Super. Oct. 1, 1987).
13. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gutowski, 113 A.2d 579, 583 (Del. 1955); Freeman v. Topkis, 40 A. 948, 949 (Del. 1893).
14. Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, Inc., 21 A.2d 283, 284 (Del. Super. 1941); Rhodes v. Silvers, 1 Del. 127, 1 Harr. 127, 128 (Del. Super. 1832).
15. Truitt v. Warrington, 84 A. 9, 10 (Del. Super. 1912); Pennington v. Lewis, 56 A. 378 (Del. Super. 1903).
15.1. Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469, 471 (Del. 2002).
16. Metropolitan Convoy Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 208 A.2d 519, 521 (Del. 1965).
17. Levin v. Smith, 513 A.2d 1292, 1296 (Del. 1986); Greenly v. Greenly, 49 A.2d 126, 129 (Del. Ch. 1946); Bradford v. Vinton, 153 A. 678, 684 (Del. Ch. 1930).
18. Steppi v. Stromwasser, 297 A.2d 26, 27 (Del. 1972); Weiner v. Wisniewski, 213 A.2d 857, 858 (Del. 1965).
19. S. v. S., 375 A.2d 451, 453 (Del. 1977); Laughlin v. Laughlin, 58 Del. 471, 210 A.2d 850, 851 (Del. 1965); Adkins v. Adkins, 190 A. 740, 741 (Del. Super. 1937).
20. In re Last Will and Testament of Melson, 711 A.2d 783, 786 (Del. 1998); In re Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386, 389 (Del. Ch. 1983); Nardo v. Nardo, 209 A.2d 905, 913 (Del. 1965); Conner v. Brown, 3 A.2d 64, 71 (Del. Super. 1938).
21. In re Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386, 389 (Del. Ch. 1983); In re Barnes’ Will, 18 A.2d 433, 434 (Del. 1941); In re Miller’s Will, 85 A. 803, 808 (Del. Super. 1912); Lodge v. Lodge’s Will, 7 Del. 418, 2 Houst. 418, 423 (Del. Super. 1862).
22. In re Conner, 226 A.2d 126, 131 (Del. Ch. 1967); Frazer v. Frazer, 2 Del. Ch. 260, 263 (Del. Ch. 1861).
23. Husband (P.J.O.) v. Wife (L.O.), 418 A.2d 994, 995 (Del. 1980).
24. Warwick v. Addicks, 157 A. 205, 207 (Del. Super. 1931).
25. Arthur Jordan Piano Co. v. Lewis, 154 A. 467, 471 (Del. Super. 1930). See also Heidelbaugh v. Cranston, 56 A. 367, 368 (Del. Super. 1903); Dickson-Wilmer v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., C.A. No. 92C-07-107, slip op. at 12-13, Barron, J. (Del. Super. Apr. 27, 1994).
26. Katz v. Exclusive Auto Leasing, Inc., 282 A.2d 866, 867 (Del. Super. 1971).
27. Claringbold v. Newark Garage & Electric Co., 97 A. 386, 387 (Del. Super. 1915); E. F. Houghton & Co. v. Alpha Process Co., 93 A. 669, 670 (Del. Super. 1915); Beaver Dam Marble Co. v. William H. Jones & Co., 92 A. 1012, 1013 (Del. Super. 1915); Hawthorne v. Murray, 84 A. 5, 7 (Del. Super. 1912).
28. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Buchanan, 78 A. 776, 779-80 (Del. 1911); Queen Anne’s R. Co. v. Reed, 59 A. 860, 862 (Del. 1905); Boyd v. Blumenthal, 52 A. 330, 332 (Del. 1902).
29. David v. Steller, 269 A.2d 203, 204 (Del. 1970); Jones v. Short, 77 A. 968, 970 (Del. 1910); Nevin v. Disharoon, 66 A. 362, 363 (Del. Super. 1907); Pennington v. Lewis, 56 A. 378 (Del. Super. 1903).
30. New York Trust Co. v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772, 785 (Del. 1940), aff’d, 315 U.S. 343 (1942), reh’g denied, 315 U.S. 8293 (1942); Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 109 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. Ch. 1954); Taormina v. Taormina Corp., 78 A.2d 473, 477 (Del. Ch. 1951).
31. First Federal Say. & Loan Asso. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 460 A.2d 543, 545 (Del. 1983); Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 190 A.2d 757, 759 (Del. 1963); Employers’ Liability Assur. Corp. v. Madric, 183 A.2d 182, 184 (Del. 1962).
32. Bragg v. Johnson, 229 A.2d 497, 498 (Del: 1967); Thomas v. King, 95 A.2d 822 (Del. Ch. 1953), aff’d, 99 A.2d 778 (Del. 1953) (burden on plaintiff when seeking an accounting); Pappas v. Venetsanos, 167 A. 842, 843 (Del. Ch. 1933), aff’’d, 171 A. 925 (Del. 1934) (burden on defendant when relying on partnership as part of a defense).
33. Facciolo v. State, Div. of Revenue, 358 A.2d 880, 881 (Del. 1976); Taylor v. Armiger Body Shop, 172 A.2d 572, 573 (Del. Ch. 1961); Arthur Jordan Piano Co. v. Lewis, 154 A. 467, 472 (Del. Super. 1930); Solomon v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 117 A. 126, 128 (Del. Super. 1922), aff’d, 119 A. 850 (Del. 1923); FNMA v. Fox, C.A. No.4421, slip op. at 4, Taylor, J. (Del. Super. May 15, 1973).
34. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 71.1.
35. Ableman v. State, 297 A.2d 380, 383 (Del. 1972); Board of Education v. 13 Acres of Land, 131 A.2d 180, 184 (Del. Super. 1957); Wilmington Housing Authority v. Harris, 93 A.2d 518, 522 (Del. Super. 1952).
36. 29 Del. C. § 10005(c).
37. Reybold Group, Inc. v. Chemprobe Technologies, Inc., 721 A.2d 1267, 1269-70 (Del. 1998); Oberly v. Howard Hughes Medical Inst., 472 A.2d 366, 390 (Del. Ch. 1984); McCartney v. Peoples R. Co., 25 Del. 191, 2 Boyce 191, 78 A. 771, 772 (Del. Super. 1911); Rennick v. Northern Maryland Corp., C.A. No. 87A-OC-6, slip op. at 11, Stiftel, J. (Del. Super. Feb. 9, 1989).
38. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 237 A.2d 708, 711 (Del. 1967); Oberly v. Howard Hughes Medical Inst., 472 A.2d 366, 370 (Del. Ch. 1984); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 713 (Del. Super. 1967).
39. Cuonzo v. Shore, 958 A.2d 840, 843 (Del. 2008); Eskridge v. Voshell, No. 307, 1990, Horsey, J. (Del. Aprl. 17, 1991) (ORDER), disposition reported at 593 A.2d 589 (Del. 1991) (TABLE); Voshell v. Attix, No. 435, 1989, slip op. at 5, Walsh, J. (Del. Mar. 21, 1990) (ORDER), disposition reported at 574 A.2d 264 (Del. 1990) (TABLE); Interim Healthcare, Inc. v. Spherion Corp., 884 A.2d 513, 545 (Del. Super.), aff’d mem., 886 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2005); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 713 (Del. Super. 1967).
40. Roi, Inc. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., C.A. No. 87C-MR-76, slip op. at 18, Walsh, J. (Del. Super. Oct. 19, 1989).
© 2010 David L. Finger