Courts have inherent power to enforce their orders and to punish persons for contempt of their dignity and authority, their rules and process.1 This power is exercised through actions for contempt of court. Such actions may be civil or criminal in nature or both.2 The two types of contempt are distinguished riot on the basis of the offending action in question, but on the basis of the purpose of the proceeding, which is usually indicated by the type of sanction to be applied. If the purpose of the contempt proceeding is to coerce the contemnor to obey the court’s order and to enforce the rights and administer the remedies to which the court has found a party to be entitled, it is civil.3 If the purpose of the proceeding is punitive in nature and is designed to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court or otherwise redress public wrongs, it is criminal contempt and is prosecuted in the name of the State.4
Criminal contempt has been codified as part of the Delaware Criminal Code.5 Since common-law crimes have been abolished, the crime of criminal contempt must fall within the conduct proscribed by Section 1271 of the Criminal Code or made a criminal contempt by another Delaware statute.6 Civil contempt, however, has not been affected in any way by the Criminal Code.7
Where the contempt is an admixture of civil and criminal elements, both aspects will be considered separately in determining both procedural and substantive aspects of the case.8
Although this treatise distinguishes between civil and criminal contempt, apart from prosecutions brought by the State for violations of the criminal contempt statute, because contempt proceedings are not intended to punish conduct prescribed as harmful by the general criminal laws, but are designed to serve the limited purpose of vindicating the authority of the court, contempt proceedings, though criminal in nature, are not criminal proceedings. Thus, even though a court, such as the Court of Chancery, may have no criminal jurisdiction, it has the inherent power to impose punishment which is criminal in nature for actions in contempt of its orders.8.1
1. DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Del. 1996); Aveta Inc. v. Bengoa, 986 A.2d 1166, 1182 (Del. Ch. 2009), app. dismissed mem., 991 A.2d 17 (Del. 2010); V.B. Woolley, Practice in Civil Actions and Proceedings in the Law Courts of the State of Delaware § 578 (1906). This inherent power is not limited by the statute defining criminal contempt, 11 Del. C. § 202(b). Thus, independent of contempt as a statutory crime, Delaware courts have the inherent power to impose criminal sanctions for contempt. DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Del. 1996).
2. Klein v. State, 127 A.2d 84, 86 (Del. 1956).
3. Delaware State Bar Asso. v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652, 665, 12 A.L.R.4th 637 (Del. 1978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 973 (1978); Wilmington v. General Teamsters Local Union, 321 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1974); State ex rel. Buckson v. Mancari, 223 A.2d 81, 82 (Del. 1966); Mother African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, C.A. No. 12055, slip op. at 14-15, Jacobs, V.C. (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1992); Dickerson v. Castle, C.A., No. 10256, slip op. at 7 & n.7, Chandler, V.C. (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1993); State Dept. of Services for Children, Youth & Their Families v. Cedars Academy, C.A. No. 1399-S, slip op. at 4 n. 2 & 5 n. 3, Allen, C. (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1989); State v. Atlas Sanitation Co., Inc., C.A. No. 9864, slip op. at 9, Allen, C. (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 1988); Miller v Steller Enterprises, Inc., C.A. No. 5717, slip op. at 8, Brown, V.C. (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 1982); Bonecutter v Oberly, C.A. No. 91M-10-4, slip op. at 2, Gebelein, J. (Del. Super. Oct. 15, 1991); Ramunno v. State, C.A. No. 89-05-1461A, slip op. at 6, Del Pesco, J. (Del. Super. Sept. 11, 1990); Brandyco Enterprises, Inc. v. State, C.A. No. 84A-SE-23, slip op. at 2, Balick, J. (Del Super. Feb. 24, 1986).
4. Delaware State Bar Asso. v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652, 665 (Del.1978), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 808 (1978), reh’g denied, 439 U.S. 973 (1978); Wilmington v. General Teamsters Local Union, 321 A.2d 123, 125 (Del. 1974); State ex rel. Buckson v. Mancari, 223 A.2d 81, 82 (Del. 1966); Dickerson v. Castle, C.A. No. 10256, slip op. at 7, Chandler, V.C. (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1993); State Dept. of Services for Children, Youth & Their Families v. Cedars Academy, C.A. No. l399-S, slip op. at 5 n. 3, Allen C. (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1989); Bonecutter v. Oberly, C.A. No. 9lM-10-4, slip op. at 2, Gebelein J. (Del. Super. Oct. 15, 1991); Ramunno v. State, C.A. No. 89-05-l461A, slip op. at 6, Del Pesco, J. (Del. Super. Sept. 11, 1990).
5. 11 Del. C. § 1271.
6. 11 Del. C. § 202(a).
7. 11 Del. C. § 202(b).
8. Wilmington v. General Teamsters Local Union, 321 A.2d 123, 126 (Del. 1974).
8.1. DiSabatino v. Salicete, 671 A.2d 1344, 1348 (Del. 1996). In addition, the Court of Chancery has statutory authority to imprison parties for disobeying its orders. 10 Del. C. § 370.
© 2010 David L. Finger