The rules relating to the use of out-of-court statements in criminal trials applies equally to admissions introduced through out-of-court statements.30.1
A confession is an express acknowledgement by a defendant in a criminal case of guilt of the crime charged or an acknowledgement of facts sufficient to establish guilt.31 Where a defendant gives a statement which admits the commission of the act charged but also includes a legal justification or excuse, such statement does not qualify as an admissible confession, although it may still be admissible as an admission. But a statement which admits the commission of the act charged along with additional facts that are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a defense is admissible as a confession.32 A plea of nolo contendere, although having the same effect as a guilty plea when entered, may not be used as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case.32.1 A confession, when admitted into evidence, is deemed to be the best and highest evidence because it is against the interest of the person making it and is presumed to flow from a sense of guilt.33
Because of the provisions of the United States and Delaware Constitutions prohibiting any deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law,34 protecting a person from being compelled to be a witness against himself or herself,35 entitling the accused to be represented by counsel36 and other provisions, courts have interposed safeguards in the form of requirements for the admissibility of an admission or a confession which must be met beyond the requirements of the formal Delaware Rules of Evidence. These requirements include an assurance endorsed by a finding by a judge that the admission or confession was voluntary,37 that certain safeguards, known as Miranda safeguards, have been met38 and that the accused has been accorded his or her full right to be represented by counsel.39
These protections apply whether the statement is a confession or a mere admission and whether the statement is that of a defendant or even of a witness.40
The admissibility of an admission or confession may be challenged before trial by a motion to suppress or by a challenge to the evidence at the time it is to be offered at trial. In either case, the matter is heard and decided by the court without or out of the hearing of the jury. The former practice under which the statement of the accused was admitted if the court determined that there was a reasonable probability that the statement was not obtained by the use of improper methods41 has given way to the current practice, generally known as the “Massachusetts rule,” under which the State must prove, and the judge must find, by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement of the accused was voluntary.42 The defendant has the right to offer testimony relating to the issue of voluntariness.43 Substantial independent evidence of the elements of the offense charged is not required in order for evidence of a confession to be submitted to the jury.44
If admitted at trial, the defendant has the right to present evidence about the circumstances surrounding the confession to allow the jury to pass upon the weight to be given to the confession.45 Although historically the practice was to instruct the jury as to considering whether a confession was voluntary,46 as the issue of admissibility is for the court, not the jury, it is sufficient if the trial court instructs the jury as to their duty to judge the reliability or weight to be given to the statement.47 The prosecution, if it desires, may present evidence contradicting any part of a confession.48 The jury must determine what degree of credit to give to a confession under the facts of the case. The jury is free to accept or reject all or any part of a confession.49
Voluntariness. To be admissible in evidence as part of the State’s case in chief, the confession must have been made by the defendant voluntarily, and not as the result of threats or improper inducements.50 The admission into evidence of an involuntary confession deprives a defendant of due process of law.51 The test of voluntariness is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances at the time the confession was made, the will of the defendant was overborne as the result of unfair and oppressive tactics by the State or whether the confession was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.52 The focus of the analysis must be on the behavior of the police and the mental and physical make-up of the defendant to determine whether the defendant’s statement was the product of a rational intellect and free will.53 The court must evaluate the specific tactics used by the police in eliciting the statements, the details of the interrogation, and the characteristics of the defendant.53.1 Factors to be considered include the age of the defendant, lack of education or low intelligence, lack of any advice as to constitutional rights, length of detention, repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep.54 Psychological coercion, for example, by lying to a defendant about an important aspect of a case, may also affect the voluntariness of a confession.55 Although historically Delaware cases have included within the guidelines for testing voluntariness that the confession must have been given free of any promise or inducement,56 it is recognized that promises or inducements, though relevant to issues of reliability and trustworthiness, do not render a confession inadmissible unless the promise or inducement is so extravagant or impressionable as to overbear the person’s will and rational thinking processes.57
The fact that at the time of making a confession a defendant was voluntarily under the influence of drugs or alcohol does not render that confession invalid per se.58 Instead, the issue becomes whether the defendant had sufficient capacity to know what he or she was saying and to have voluntarily intended to say it.59 The use of reasonable force in effecting an arrest does not itself impair the voluntariness of a statement made during the process of subjugation nor taint an incriminating statement thereafter given to the police.60
Where questioning occurs by people other than law enforcement officials, such as medical personnel, before testing the various procedural safeguards it must be first established that the questioning was done in contemplation of prosecuting the individual being questioned. A seemingly neutral examination can be made subject to constitutional standards where the examiner, though not connected with the investigation or prosecution of criminal offenses, expressly or implicitly agrees to collaborate in the prosecution of the individual. In other words, the examiner must intend to elicit statements that will assist in the prosecution of the one being questioned.60.1
Miranda Rules. The rules established by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona61 were designed to provide extra protection for the right not to incriminate oneself by requiring specific warnings and conduct by the police to individuals in their custody. The rules apply to interrogation of a suspect after arrest, or before arrest where there is a restraint, on freedom of movement which a reasonable person would associate with a formal arrest. Interrogation in this “custodial” setting is thought to be inherently coercive, thus requiring offsetting procedures. “The existence of custodial interrogation is therefore to be determined from the perspective of a reasonable man in the position of the suspect, not from the perspective of the police.”62 But the mere fact of a coercive environment is not enough. There must be an arrest or its equivalent. For example, when a suspect comes to the police station upon invitation and on several occasions is free to leave, Miranda will not apply.63 Miranda does not extend to routine, initial scene investigations by the police.64
Among the factors a court may consider in determining whether or not a pre-arrest interrogation is “custodial” are: (i) whether the party was informed at the time of the interrogation that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request that the officer do so, or that the party was not considered to be under arrest; (ii) whether the party possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; (iii) whether the party initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to respond to questions; (iv) whether strong-arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning; (v) whether the atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; (vi) whether the party was placed under arrest after the termination of questioning; (vii) when and where the interrogation occurred; (viii) how long the interrogation lasted; (ix) how many police were involved; (x) whether the party was interrogated as a witness or as a suspect; and (xi) how the party got to the place of questioning, e.g., on his or her own, in response to a police request or escorted by a police officer.65
Miranda does not apply to questioning undertaken at a routine traffic stop or to ordinary tests given to drivers at such stops, such as breathalyzer and chemical tests, but in the case of an accusation or arrest arising from a traffic stop, whether for a serious or minor infraction, Miranda will apply.66 Questions in an emergency room to the occupant of an automobile seeking identification of all of the occupants, including where they sat and who was driving, were deemed not subject to Miranda.67 An interrogation in a hospital was deemed not to be custodial where the defendant’s inability to leave was due to severe medical problems, and not because of police coercion and the defendant was free to demand that the police cease questioning.67.1 In an investigation of a murder at a home, where the owner was confined to the living room while the police investigated the physical facts, the restraint was not considered sufficiently significant to constitute a custodial interrogation triggering the Miranda rules.68
The Miranda case established the following procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination of an individual who is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom in any significant way and subjected to questioning by the authorities: the individual must be advised and warned prior to any questioning that he or she has the right to remain silent, that anything that the individual says may be used against him or her in a court of law, that the individual has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he or she cannot afford an attorney and so desires one, an attorney will be appointed to represent him or her. After such advice and warnings, the individual may waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement, but any such waiver must be shown to have been made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.69
Unless and until the foregoing warnings are demonstrated by the prosecution, the State may not introduce at trial any evidence obtained as a result of the interrogation.70 The burden is on the prosecution to establish full compliance with Miranda by a preponderance of the evidence.71 If the statement is not admissible as affirmative evidence because the State failed to meet the requirements of Miranda, the statement may still be admissible to impeach the defendant who testifies, even where the defendant seeks to forestall this by introducing his or her own statement, provided that the statement is determined to be voluntary and trustworthy.72 A determination of trustworthiness necessarily requires a determination that the statement was voluntary.73
If after the advice and warnings the accused exercises his or her right to remain silent, the prosecution is not entitled to bring out the fact of such silence at trial,74 not even for impeachment purposes,75 unless the defendant testifies and the fact of the post-arrest silence is inconsistent with the defendant’s testimony regarding his or her post-arrest behavior.76 However, Miranda does not prohibit relevant evidence as to the silence of the accused that occurred before the arrest or other significant deprivation of the freedom of the accused.77
The accused may waive all or any of these rights provided the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.78 The State has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his or her rights. In assessing whether or not the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, a court must be assured that the relinquishment of the right was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. A court must be further assured that the waiver was made with full awareness of both the nature and consequences of the decision to abandon it.78.1.
Determinations that a waiver is voluntary are guided by standards applicable in determining the admissibility of confessions, since the possibility of coercion by improper conduct is the same in either case.79 The voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, like the voluntariness of a confession, depends upon the absence of police overreaching, and not upon an abstract inquiry into the defendant’s “free will” or subjective view of reality. The issue of voluntariness of a waiver will depend upon whether or not there was governmental coercion, and not upon whether or not there was moral or psychological pressure to confess from sources other than governmental coercion.79.1 A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the totality of the circumstances at the time of the waiver make it likely that accused understood the plain meaning of the rights being waived and that his or her statements could be used in court.80 It is not necessary, however, that the accused understand the full tactical significance of the waiver.81
In assessing whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent, courts use an objective standard. The court takes into account the individual’s age, education, level of experience, level of intelligence, condition at the time of the waiver, such as the effect of sleepiness, intoxication, background, comprehension of English and similar matters which may affect comprehension at the time of the waiver.82 But not every frailty or idiosyncracy will be a basis for invalidating a waiver.83 So long as it may be concluded that the accused understood the plain meaning of the rights, no one factor, be it low intelligence,84 intoxication,85 young age86 or language difficulty,87 will invalidate the waiver. If the accused raises a defense of insanity or mental incompetency, this constitutes a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights to the extent of the competency examination. The testimony of the examiner may be used to rebut the claim.88
If the accused makes a statement or answers questions after having received an adequate warning, he or she thereby waives the right to remain silent.89 But whether or not the accused has signed a waiver, voluntarily answered questions or otherwise waived his or her rights,90 the accused is entitled to end any interrogation at any time. When the accused indicates that the interview is at an end, the police must desist from all further attempts to interrogate.91 If the accused subsequently expresses a desire to talk, the police must give a fresh set of warnings.92 The accused has no right to be advised specifically of his or her right to discontinue.93
If there has been a break after the advice and warnings were given or after some interrogation has been conducted, the right of the police to begin or renew the interrogation at a later time without giving fresh advice and warnings will depend upon the length of the elapsed time during the breaks and the other circumstances of the renewal. Where Miranda warnings were given at the time the defendant was picked up by the police but the defendant was not interrogated and made no statement before arriving at the police station less than two hours after the advice and warnings were given, at which time the police made comments to the defendant regarding clothing which resulted in an incriminating admission as to ownership of a box containing clothing and also illegal drugs, the court held that the failure to give fresh advice and warnings did not invalidate the admission.94
The requirement of Miranda warnings is not limited to the police investigating the specific crime for which the defendant is in custody. For example, in one case officers investigating a parole violation interviewed an accused then in prison without giving Miranda warnings and obtained statements which were incriminating to the accused. The statements were ruled to be inadmissible due to the failure to give Miranda warnings and advice. The court ruled that Miranda applied to a wide range of government agents and to custodial questions to a person in custody on a different matter.95
Although statements obtained in violation of Miranda are not admissible as substantive evidence, if the statements are found to be otherwise voluntary, they may be introduced for the purpose of impeachment.95.1
The Right To Counsel. The right to counsel under Miranda parallels the right to remain silent under Miranda but is somewhat narrower in the way it attaches under the Sixth Amendment.96 Miranda rights do not attach until, arrest or its equivalent. Sixth Amendment rights attach as soon as a proceeding has begun, whether by arrest or by formal complaint and warrant for arrest or by information or indictment or by arraignment with waiver of presentment of indictment.97 Statements taken in violation of the right to counsel are inadmissible at trial.97.1
Establishing waiver of Sixth Amendment rights is more difficult than establishing waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, and the State carries a heavy burden. Under the Sixth Amendment, the State must show, in addition to the Miranda requirements, that the accused understood the nature of the right, that the accused by words or conduct indicated an affirmative desire to relinquish the right and that the accused did so voluntarily.98 The Miranda right is waived unless the accused affirmatively requests counsel or declines to answer without advice of counsel.99
Under the Sixth Amendment, as in the case of the Miranda right to counsel, an accused who voluntarily answers a question or makes a statement with full awareness of the right to counsel thereby waives the right to counsel.100 As in the case of the Miranda right, the waiver may be withdrawn at any time by invoking the right to counsel, at which point interrogation must cease and not be renewed unless there is a subsequent clear waiver.101 The requirements for a valid waiver are the same under the Sixth Amendment as under Miranda.102
The right to counsel must be invoked by conveying the request to the persons who would otherwise seek to question the suspect in the adversarial process, usually to the interrogating police officer, sometimes at arraignment, which is sufficient.103
Admissions and Confessions During Illegal Detention. A confession obtained during an illegal detention is inadmissible without regard to its voluntariness.104
The existence of a confession does not end the case. In the absence of independent proof of the corpus dilecti,105 a confession is inadequate of itself to sustain a conviction.106 The purpose of this rule is to prevent individuals from being convicted of a crime by confession where there has been no other evidence that a crime has been committed, and so protect people who may be pressured to confess to crimes they did not commit or crimes that did not occur.107 There is no precise quantum of proof required to establish the corpus dilecti. Instead, there must be some independent evidence which, taken together with the confession, establishes the corpus dilecti beyond a reasonable doubt.108
The existence of a confession does not relieve the State from having to prove the degree of the crime.109 Further, the State cannot use the confession of one co-defendant against other non-confessing co-defendants. 110
An admission by a criminal defendant may only be introduced by an adverse party. A criminal defendant may not introduce his or her own prior statement as an admission.110.1
30.1. See §16:8.
31. Brown v. State, 105 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1954). See also State v. Blackburn, 75 A. 536, 542 (Del. O. & T. 1892).
32. Brown v. State, 105 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1954).
32.1. Betts v. State, 983 A.2d 75, 76 (Del. 2009).
33. State v. Lee, 171 A. 195, 199 (Del. O. & T. 1933); State v. Prettyman, 100 A. 476, 478 (Del. O. & T. 1917); State v. Wiggins, 76 A. 632, 635-36 (Del. O. & T. 1908); State v. Tilghman, 63 A. 772, 774 (Del. O. & T. 1906); State v. Powell, 61 A. 966, 972 (Del. O. & T. 1904); State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563, 4 Harr. 563, 564 (Del. O. & T. 1847); State v. Baynard, 1 Del. Cas. 662, 665 (Del. 0. & T. 1794).
34. U.S. Const. am. XIV; Del. Const. art. I, § 7.
35. U.S. Const. am. V; Del. Const. art. 1, § 7.
36. U.S. Const. am. VI; Del. Const. art. I, § 7.
37. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483 (1972).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh’g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966).
39. Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 589-90 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987).
40. The distinction between an admission and a confession was raised in Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 387-88 (Del. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955), and recognized in Brown v. State, 105 A.2d 646 (Del. 1954), and was overturned in Hatcher v. State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. 1975), and State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d 943 (Del. 1979). The Delaware Supreme Court pointed out that the possibility of coercion was the same whether an out-of-court statement of a witness or of a defendant is involved. The observation is equally applicable to an out-of-court admission which does not constitute a confession. The Delaware Supreme Court has treated admissions and confessions the same way for the requirement of voluntariness. See Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1199 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992).
41. Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 387 (Del. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955).
42. State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d 943, 949 (Del. 1979); Mealey v. State, 347 A.2d 651, 653 (Del. 1975); Hatcher v. State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. 1975); Outlaw v. State, 327 A.2d 606 (Del. 1974); Dickerson v. State, 325 A.2d 367, 368 (Del. 1974); Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 387 (Del. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955); State v. Priest, 193 A.2d 593, 599 (Del. Super. 1963). Any testimony on the issue by the defendant may be used by the State at trial for the purpose of impeachment. State v. Foraker, 446 A.2d 1105, 1007 (Del. Super. 1982).
43. Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 387 (Del. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955); State v. Priest, 193 A.2d 593, 599 (Del. Super. 1963).
44. Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 125-26 (Del. 1975).
45. Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 116 & n.7 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) (jury passes on weight but not admissibility of confession); Oney v. State, 482 A.2d 756, 759 (Del. 1984). See also Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 387 (Del. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955). That right may be restricted if the trial court finds that the defendant is trying to offer the evidence for a purpose other than establishing state of mind at the time the statement was made. See Simonson v. State, No. 50, 1987, slip op. at 6-7, Holland, J. (Del. May 27, 1988) (ORDER), disposition reported at 542 A. 2d 1215 (Del. 1988) (TABLE) (defendant sought to produce evidence of drug addiction as sympathy ploy).
46. Downing v. State, 188 A.2d 224, 227 (Del. 1963).
47. Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 116 n.3 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Harris v. State, No. 425, 1991, slip op. at 6, Walsh, J. (Del. Feb. 3, 1993) (ORDER), disposition reported at 622 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1993) (TABLE); Ward v. State, Nos. 137, 154 & 156, 1990, slip op. at 6, Horsey, 1. (Del. Sept. 9, 1991) (ORDER), disposition reported at 602 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1991) (TABLE).
48. State v. Lee, 171 A. 195, 199 (Del. O. & T. 1933).
49. State v. Lee, 171 A. 195 (Del. O. & T. 1933); State v. Prettyman, 100 A. 476, 479 (Del. O. & T. 1917); State v. Brown, 80 A. 146, 150 (Del. O. & T. 1911); State v. Wiggins, 76 A. 632, 635-36 (Del. O. & T. 1908); State v. Tilghman, 63 A. 772, 774 (Del. O. & T. 1906); State v. Powell, 61 A. 966, 972 (Del. O. & T. 1904).
50. Brown v. State, 105 A.2d 646, 649 (Del. 1954); State v. Prettyman, 100 A. 476, 478 (Del. O. & T. 1917); State v. Brown, 80 A. 146, 149-50 (Del. O. & T. 1911); State v. Bostick, 4 Del. 563, 4 Harr. 563, 564 (Del. O. & T. 1847).
51. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1196 (Del. 1995); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 431 (Del. 1982); State v. Bright, 683 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. Super. 1996).
52. Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1199 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 28 (U.S. 1992); Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1168 (Del. 1990); Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 307 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101(1989); Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 690 (Del. 1986); Anderson v. State, 452 A.2d 955, 957 (Del. 1982); Blankenship v. State, 447 A.2d 428, 431 (Del. 1982); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); Fullman v. State, 389 A.2d 1292, 1296-97 (Del. 1978); Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 388 (Del. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 983 (1955); Brown v. State, No. 258, 1987, slip op. at 9, Christie, J. (Del. Sept. 15, 1988) (ORDER), disposition reported at 548 A.2d 778 (Del. 1988) (TABLE) ; Simonson v. State, No. 50, 1987, slip op. at 4, Holland, J. (Del. May 27, 1988) (ORDER), disposition reported at 542 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1988) (TABLE); State v. Bryan, 551 A.2d 807, 816 (Del. Super. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 571 A.2d 170 (Del. 1990); State v. Priest, 193 A.2d 593, 600 (Del. Super. 1963); State v. Aiken, Cr. A. Nos. 1N92-0l-l293, slip op. at 5, Barron, J. (Del. Super. Oct. 9, 1992); State v. Augustine, Cr. A. Nos. 1N9109-l557-l559 & 1728, slip op. at 22-23, Herlihy, J. (Del. Super. Oct. 8, 1992).
53. Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1168 (Del. 1990); Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 690 (Del. 1986); State v. DeJesus, Cr. A. No. 3011746, slip op. 9-10, Babiarz, J. (Del. Super. Nov. 6, 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 655 A.2d 1180 (Del. 1995); State v. Kopera, Cr. A. No. 90-11-0553, slip op. at 13, Graves, J. (Del. Super. Oct. 17, 1991).
53.1. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1196 (Del. 1995).
54. Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 690 (Del. 1986); Fuliman v. State, 389 A.2d 1292, 1296 (Del. 1978). See also Haug v. State, 406 A.2d 38, 43 (Del. 1979); Mealey v. State, 347 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. 1975).
55. Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 690 n.14 (Del. 1986).
56. State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d 943, 948 (Del. 1979); State v. Priest, 193 A.2d 593, 598 (Del. Super. 1963).
57. Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 311 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989); Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 690 n.14 (Del. 1986); State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d 943, 948 (Del. 1979); State v. Priest, 193 A.2d 593, 598 (Del. Super. 1963); State v. Donovan, 8 A.2d 876, 878 (Del. O. & T. 1939).
58. Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Del. 1983); Brown v. State, No. 258, 1987, slip op. at 9, Christie, J. (Del. Sept. 15, 1988) (ORDER), disposition reported at 548 A.2d 778 (Del. 1988) (TABLE); Simonson v. State, No. 50, 1987, slip op. at 4, Holland, J. (May 27, 1988) (ORDER), disposition reported at 542 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1988) (TABLE).
59. Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Del. 1983).
60. Winsett v. State, 251 A.2d 199, 200 (Del. 1968).
60.1. State v. Bright, 683 A.2d 1055, 1060 (Del. Super. 1996).
61. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh’g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966).
62. Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1195 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992). Accord DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1190 (Del. 1995).
63. Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1192-95 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992); Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1355-56 (Del. 1992); Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1167 (Del. 1990).
64. Laury v. State, 260 A.2d 907, 908 (Del. 1969).
65. State v. Alexander, Cr. A. Nos. IN92-06-0968-0970 & 1N92-OS-0240-0241, slip op. at 9-12, Cooch, J. (Del. Super. Feb. 17, 1994).
66. State v. Coyle, 567 A.2d 870, 874 (Del. Super. 1989); Roberts v. State, 494 A.2d 156, 160 (Del. 1985).
67. Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 92-94 (Del. 1989). See also Tucker v. State, 411 A.2d 603 (Del. 1980).
67.1. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1191 (Del. 1995).
68. Conyers v. State, 396 A.2d 157, 159 (Del. 1978).
69. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), reh’g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966). See also Gray v. State, 441 A.2d 209, 216 (Del. 1981).
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh’g denied, 385 U.S. 890 (1966). See also Collins v. State, 420 A.2d 170, 176 (Del. 1980). Where the statement was made spontaneously at the time of arrest without interrogation or coercion, a hearing on voluntariness was not required. Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158, 167 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 867 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 873 (1985).
71. Marine v. State, 607 A,2d 1185, 1195 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 28 (U.S. 1992); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982).
72. Holder v. State, 692 A.2d 882, 888 (Del. 19978); Walton v. State, 407 A.2d 535 (Del. 1979); Foraker v. State, 394 A.2d 208, 212 (Del. 1978).
73. Hill v. State, 316 A.2d 557, 560 (Del. 1974).
74. Bowe v. State, 514 A.2d 408, 410-12 (Del. 1986); Styler v. State, 417 A.2d 948, 950 (Del. 1980); Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194, 201 (Del. 1979); Shantz v. State, 344 A.2d 245, 246-47 (Del. 1975).
75. Lewis v. State, 626 A.2d 1350, 1358 (Del. 1993).
76. Johnson v. State, No. 105, 1983, slip op. at 3, McNeilly, J. (Del. Mar. 14, 1984) (ORDER), disposition reported at 482 A.2d 765 (Del. 1984) (TABLE).
77. Lewis v. State, 626 A.2d 1350, 1358 (Del. 1993); Aaron v. State, 275 A.2d 791, 794 (Del. 1971).
78. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. 1995); Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Del. 1993); Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 311 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989); Holmes v. State, 300 A.2d 6, 7 (Del. 1972).
78.1. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. 1995)
79. Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 311 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989); Hatcher v. State, 337 A.2d 30, 32 (Del. 1975).
79.1. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192-93 (Del. 1995)
80. Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Del. 1989). See also DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. 1995)
81. Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Del. 1993); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1196 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992).
82. Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Del. 1993); Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Del. 1983); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982).
83. Liu v. State, 628 A.!2d 1376, 1381 (Del. 1993).
84. Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Del. 1983); State v. Oakes, 373 A.2d 210, 213 (Del. 1977); Mealey v. State, 347 A.2d 651, 652 (Del. 1975).
85. Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1197 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992); Haug v. State, 406 A.2d 38, 43 (Del. 1979). The use of intoxicants does not per se render an admission involuntary as being in violation of Miranda. Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1176 (Del. 1983). The issue is whether the defendant had sufficient capacity to know what he or she was saying and voluntarily intended to say it. Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 1183 (Del. 1983); State v. Russo, 700 A.2d 161, 175 (Del. Super. 1996), aff’d mem., 694 A.2d 48 (Del. 1997).
86. Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1197 (Del. 1990), review dismissed, 505 U.S. 1247 (1992).
87. Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1380 (Del. 1993).
88. Re v. State, 540 A.2d 423, 429 (Del. 1988).
89. Boyer v. State, 436 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Del. 1981); Aaron v. State, 275 A.2d 791, 794 (Del. 1971).
90. An express written waiver is not required. Gray v. State, 441 A.2d 209, 217 (Del. 1981); Hooks v. State, 416 A.2d 189, 200 (Del. 1980); Dorbolo v. State, 405 A.2d 106, 108 (Del. 1979).
91. Tucker v. State, 411 A.2d 603, 604-05 (Del. 1980); Holmes v. State, 300 A.2d 6, 7 (Del. 1971).
92. Dodson v. State, 513 A.2d 761, 764 (Del. 1986); Tucker v. State, 411 A.2d 603 (Del. 1980).
93. Gray v. State, 441 A.2d 209, 217 (Del. 1981).
94. Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d 1125, 1129-30 (Del. 1989).
95. Bradley v. State, 559 A.2d 1234, 1245-46 (Del. 1989).
95.1. Holder v. State, 692 A.2d 882 (Del. 1997).
96. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States is made applicable to the states by virtue of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
97. Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 175-77 (Del. 1990); Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1166 (Del. 1990); Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 308-10 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 589-90 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 113 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985).
97.1. Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1371 (Del. 1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1136 (1995).
98. Lovett v. State, 516 A.2d 455, 462 (Del. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 589 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987). See also Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 685-86 (Del. 1983) (waiver deemed invalid when the police failed to tell the accused that a lawyer retained for him was in the police station to render legal advice).
99. Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Del. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
100. Boyer v. State, 436 A.2d 1118, 1124 (Del. 1981).
101. Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1101 (Del. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869 (1986).
102. Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 311 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989); Lovett v. State, 516 A.2d 455, 463 (Del. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987).
103. Alston v. State, 554 A.2d 304, 310 (Del. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989). The request of a juvenile to talk to an adult such as a parent or rehabilitation officer is not a request for counsel and need not be honored. Haug v. State, 406 A.2d 38, 42-43 (Del. 1979).
104. Hopkins v. State, 501 A.2d 774, 776-77 (Del. 1985); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 588 n.8 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Anderson v. State, 452 A.2d 955, 957-58 (Del. 1982); Haug v. State, 406 A.2d 38, 41 (Del. 1979); Fullman v. State, 389 A.2d 1292, 1297 (Del. 1978); Webster v. State, 213 A.2d 298, 301 (Del. 1965); Vorhauer v. State, 212 A.2d 886, 891 (Del. 1965); State v. Hanna, 542 A.2d 794, 798-99 (Del. Super. 1988), rev’d on other grounds, 591 A.2d 158 (Del. 1991); State v. Coyle, 567 A.2d 870, 875 (Del. Super. 1989); State v. Wright, Cr. A. No. 91004136, slip op. at 3, Del Pesco, J. (Del. Super. Aug. 6, 1992).
105. “Corpus dilecti” means “the commission of a crime by somebody.” Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13 (Del. 1987); State v. Galvano, 154 A. 461, 463-64 (Del. O. & T. 1930). The term refers to evidence showing (1) injury, death or loss according to the nature of the crime and (2) criminal means as the cause of the injury, death or loss. DeJesus v. State, 655 A.2d 1180, 1192 (Del. 1995); Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 125 (Del. 1975); Derrickson v. State, 321 A.2d 497, 502 (Del. 1974); Nelson v. State, 123 A.2d 859, 861 (Del. 1956). In the case of murder, manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide, the corpus dilecti is established when the State presents independent evidence of the death of a human being that was caused by criminal means. For felony murder, however, the State must also introduce some independent evidence of the criminal conduct forming the gravamen of the underlying predicate felony. DeJesus v. State, 635 A.2d 1180, 1200-02 (Del. 1995).
106. Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1168 (Del. 1990); Bright v. State, 490 A.2d 564, 569 (Del. 1985); Stokes v. State, 402 A.2d 376, 382 (Del. 1979); Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13 (Del. 1987); Johnson v. State, 338 A.2d 124, 125 (Del. 1975); Derrickson v. State, 321 A.2d 497, 502 (Del. 1974); Nelson v. State, 50 Del. 96, 123 A.2d 859, 861 (Del. 1956); State v. Blackburn, 75 A. 536, 542 (Del. O. & T. 1892); State v. Madura, Cr. A. No. 1-75-10-0096, slip op. at 3-4, Stiftel, J. (Del. Super. May 18, 1976), aff’d mem., 367 A.2d 650 (Del. 1976).
107 . DeJesus v. State, 635 A.2d 1180, 1199 (Del. 1995); Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1168-69 (Del. 1990); Bright v. State, 490 A.2d 564, 569 (Del. 1985).
108. Shipley v. State, 570 A.2d 1159, 1169 (Del. 1990); Jenkins v. State, 401 A.2d 83, 86 (Del. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Whitfield v. State, 524 A.2d 13 (Del. 1987); Nelson v. State, 123 A.2d 859, 861-62 (Del. 1956); State v. Kehm, 103 A.2d 781, 782 (Del. Super. 1954); State v. Madura, Cr. A. No. 1-75-10-0096, slip op. at 7-8, Stiftel, J. (Del. Super. May 18, 1976), aff’d mem., 367 A.2d 650 (Del. 1976).
109. Longoria v. State, 168 A.2d 695, 703 (Del. 1961), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 10 (1961).
110. State v. Prettyman, 100 A. 476, 478 (Del. O. & T. 1917); State v. Jackson, 82 A. 824, 825 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1912); State v. Brown, 80 A. 146, 150 (Del. 0. & T. 1911). See also State v. Brinte, 58 A. 258, 263 (Del. O. & T. 1904).
110.1. Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. 1995).
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